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Abstract
In this paper we argue that ecological evolutionary developmental biology (eco-
evo-devo) accounts of cognitive modernity are compatible with cultural evolution 
theories of language built upon iterated learning models. Cultural evolution mod-
els show that the emergence of near universal properties of language do not require 
the preexistence of strong specific constraints. Instead, the development of general 
abilities, unrelated to informational specificity, like the copying of complex sig-
nals and sharing of communicative intentions is required for cultural evolution to 
yield specific properties, such as language structure. We argue that eco-evo-devo 
provides the appropriate conceptual background to ground an account for the many 
interconnected genetic, environmental and developmental factors that facilitated the 
emergence of an organic system able to develop language through the iterated trans-
mission of information. We use the concept of niche construction to connect evo-
lutionary developmental accounts for sensory guided motor capacities and cultural 
evolution guided by iterated learning models. This integrated theoretical model aims 
to build bridges between biological and cultural approaches.
Keywords Language evolution · Cultural evolution · Extended evolutionary 
synthesis · Niche construction · Eco-evo-devo
Introduction
Cultural evolution and biological evolution share a number of similarities that 
have long been recognised (e.g. Darwin 1871; Lumsden and Wilson 1981; Boyd 
and Richerson 1985; Durham 1991). But since cultural inheritance and biological 
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inheritance also encompass necessarily different features (e.g. Boyd and Richer-
son 2005; Tëmkin and Eldredge 2007; Mace and Holden 2005), the study of both 
disciplines has followed relatively independent paths in terms of the methodolo-
gies and approaches used by each. Notwithstanding a number of scholars have 
argued that studying cultural phenomena within a unifying framework that takes 
insights from evolutionary biology is potentially useful to integrate separate dis-
ciplines (Mesoudi et al. 2006; Charbonneau 2016). Cross-disciplinary approaches 
have also been defended for the field of language evolution (e.g. Bickerton 2003; 
Christiansen et  al. 2002), although the uniqueness of human languages has 
undoubtedly delayed the construction of theoretical integrated frameworks incor-
porating both the findings in computational modelling and state-of-the-art empir-
ical knowledge in evolutionary developmental biology.
Human languages are different from other animal communication systems. For 
example, they exhibit a semantically compositional structure that enables humans 
to manipulate long and complex chains of signals. This feature is known as the 
Fredge’s Principle of Compositionality, which essentially boils down to the fact 
that the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its parts 
(for an overview: Krifka 1999; Szabó 2017, and references therein). Composi-
tionality of meaning is generally assumed to be intimately connected to two other 
distinguishing properties of natural languages, namely their productivity and their 
systematicity (Fodor and Lepore 2002), which in turn are related to a property of 
the syntactic principles responsible for the construction of complex expressions. 
This distinctive feature of language is often referred to as recursion (e.g. Hauser 
et al. 2002). Other properties of languages are duality of pattern, convexity, lin-
earity or displacement (Hockett 1960, 1966). The simultaneous presence of these 
distinctive features makes human languages open-ended communication systems 
(Kirby 2017).
A common way to explain the origins of these features and, more generally, 
language structure, is natural selection (e.g Pinker and Bloom 1990). But, as Eric 
Lenneberg pointed out, this approach can be problematic if it intends to explain 
evolution as a simplistic and unidirectional mapping of genotypes onto pheno-
types, and it only pays attention to “the biological usefulness of certain features of 
animal communication” (Lenneberg 1967, p. 253). Firstly, because evolutionary 
biological dynamics can be radically altered by other external pressures such as 
the environment (Gilbert and Epel 2009; Sultan 2015) or, in the case of linguistic 
phenotypes, culture (Kirby 2017); secondly, because dependencies between genes 
and phenotypes can not be drawn unidirectionally or attending to a single locus 
(Marcus and Fisher 2003; Fisher and Vernes 2015) when it comes to explaining 
language; and finally, because it has been shown that a constellation of processes 
that bias selection and modify the frequency of heritable variation, such as devel-
opmental biases and niche construction, can alter the way in which natural selec-
tion proceeds (Laland et al. 2000; Robert 2004; Deacon 2010; Lewens 2019).
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we will focus on the defi-
nition of domain specificity and we will propose a revision of the concept in light of 
alternative models that eschew traditional versions of genetic determinism. Then, in 
Sect. 3 we will review some relevant models suggesting that language regularities 
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can be successfully acquired and transmitted without the need of strong genetic 
encoding. In Sect. 4, we expound the minimum requirements for iterated learning to 
work in the light of recent controversies. Then, in Sect. 5 we provide a brief review 
of the history that led to the development of eco-evo-devo models and argue for the 
need to abandon traditional dichotomies in order to better account for the linguistic 
phenotype. Finally, in Sect. 6 we will revisit a variety of studies that might be add-
ing evidence to support the main hypothesis of this paper: the conceptual apparatus 
of eco-evo-devo models is compatible with the findings of iterated learning models 
and helps dissolving the boundaries between a traditional dichotomy that has been 
limiting our understanding of the evolution of language. Using the notion of niche 
construction, where individual organisms play a much central role than in stand-
ard approaches, we will propose an integrated theoretical framework that stresses 
the need to connect the development of sensory-guided motor capacities and the 
requirements for iterated learning. Our conceptual model intends to help fill gaps in 
our knowledge about how variational explanations (changes due to variation within 
the population) and developmental explanations (changes due to variation within the 
individual) relate, as well as to provide a framework for language and cultural evolu-
tion to advance in the construction of new hypotheses upon which triple-inheritance 
models can be developed.
Domain specificity
The modularity of mind is a hypothesis about the architecture of mind according 
to which a number of cognitive systems, typically associated to perception, oper-
ate in characteristic ways that makes them, among other things, domain-specific 
and mostly impermeable to the operation of other modules and cognitive systems 
(Fodor 1983, 1985). There is no conceptual or logical connection between the 
notion of modularity and nativism. But it is often the case that their proponents, 
on the basis of such considerations as the poverty of stimulus argument, assume 
that such functionally defined modules are associated to the corresponding Chom-
skyan-modules (that is, innate repositories of domain-specific information that 
are supposed to underlie our cognitive abilities in various domains). Accordingly, 
a system is domain specific if the class of objects and properties that it computes 
information about is restricted within narrow limits (Fodor 2000; Robbins 2017). 
Under this definition, humans would be endowed with systems of knowledge 
which serve as specialized evolutionary devices for specific tasks. For example, 
knowledge of language would be a domain-specific system that gives humans the 
ability required for the acquisition and use of language (Chomsky 1986; Spelke 
and Kinzler 2007). A particularly radical version of this stance is exemplified by 
evolutionary psychology and its massive modularity thesis according to which all 
extant human cognitive abilities (not just the peripheral ones) are modular and, 
also, adaptations to the environment of the Stone Age (Barkow 1992; Plotkin 
1997). Differences as to the extent of modularity notwithstanding and focusing 
our attention on language, it is certainly true that both stances appear to be com-
mitted to some form of nativism according to which neurally specific modules for 
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language are shaped by specific genes (Pinker and Jackendoff 2005; Berwick and 
Chomsky 2016; Kirby 2017). Researchers have found support for domain speci-
ficity in many different ways: e.g., looking at the competencies of infants, com-
paring human capacities with other animals or using the poverty of the stimulus 
argument as evidence for universal grammar (Chomsky 1967; Pinker 1991; Ber-
wick et al. 2011).
But attempts to address key questions such us “why only us?” (see Berwick and 
Chomsky 2016) or, how do children acquire language without sufficient evidence 
in the primary linguistic data (Chomsky 1965), have not always ended up propos-
ing models that verify the existence of a domain-specific module for language. To 
be sure, even the human- and language-specificity of the computational operation 
Merge, the only putative genetically determined residue of UG in Chomsky’s Mini-
malist Program (Chomsky 1995, and later work), has been called into question on 
the grounds of a detailed analysis from the perspective of the notion of biological 
homology (Balari and Lorenzo 2013, 2015). In the field of cultural evolution, these 
same questions have been addressed using a variety of experimental and computa-
tional methods that, without relying on strong genetic constraints or domain spec-
ificity, model the successful acquisition and emergence of universal properties of 
language (e.g. Zuidema 2002; Kovas and Plomin 2006; Scerif and Karmiloff-Smith 
2005; Morgan et al. 1989; Chater et al. 2009; Smith and Wonnacott 2010; Culbert-
son and Kirby 2016).
The notion of domain specificity has traditionally been linked with innateness in 
different ways, causing significant confusion in the field. However, if proponents of 
innateness argue that language acquisition is determined by genetic factors, and pro-
ponents of domain specificity claim that language is processed in localized modules 
that deal exclusively with a single information type, then we can no more argue that 
these two issues are automatically interchangeable in the debates about the evolution 
of language (Bates 1994; Elman et al. 1996).
It is relatively common ground in the field of cultural evolution studies that 
domain-specific constraints, when genetically wired, might have evolved to take the 
form of weak biases or general capacities that, amplified by culture, interact with the 
linguistic system in domain-specific ways (Culbertson and Kirby 2016). Be that as it 
may, we suspect that the whole debate may acquire a totally different flavor as soon 
as one adopts a developmental view. Firstly, because of the fact, firmly established 
already by 19th century embryologists like Karl Ernst von Baer, that all develop-
ment follows a pattern going from the less specific to the particular and is hardly 
a matter of master control genes (Minelli 2003). Secondly, because the traditional 
interpretation of the innate-acquired distinction, where what is innate is typically 
assumed to be internal to the object in question and, consequently, genetic, is most 
probably misleading (Wimsatt 1986; Keller 2010). We see no reason why the case 
of language should be different.
In the next section we will review some models that show how language features 
can emerge in the absence of strong genetic constraints, and demonstrate how such 
abilities as copying and sharing might be sufficient, when combined with iterative 
learning, to yield outputs that appear domain-specific without the need for strong 
language-related biological predispositions.
1 3
Eco-evo-devo and iterated learning: towards an integrated… Page 5 of 23 42
Challenging domain‑specificity
The argument from the poverty of stimulus (henceforth, POS) states that children 
are not exposed to sufficient data within their linguistic environment to induce their 
native language. In 1967, Mark Gold provided a formal proof that has usually been 
interpreted as evidence for this argument (Gold 1967). Gold’s proof showed that, 
given a context-free grammar, regardless of the number of samples from an infinite 
language a presented to a learning algorithm, the algorithm can not accurately deter-
mine whether the samples belong to an infinite language or to a finite subset thereof 
containing the samples in question.
To investigate how a grammar that would be unlearnable by Gold’s method could 
be acquired successfully, Zuidema (2002) constructed a model that uses “cultural 
evolution.” The model implements linguistic abilities using context-free grammars 
and three operations called “incorporation,” “compression” and “generalization.” 
When the algorithm is initiated it produces random strings, simulating transmission 
from the parent to the child. In these randomly generated strings some regularities 
may appear, for example: aab, bab, cab. In this example, the child can compress 
the substring ab into the non-terminal X: S ↦ aX , S ↦ bX , S ↦ cX , X ↦ ab . Then, 
say the child obtains another rule from another set of strings: Y ↦ d . Now, the gen-
eralization operation can equate the non-terminals X and Y. This means the child 
can obtain the unobserved strings ad, bd, cd from the resulting grammar. Over gen-
erations, in a population of agents, language becomes more structured and unseen 
strings more learnable, increasing communicative success. With this elegant model, 
Zuidema (2002) showed that POS is not necessarily a problem for learners to suc-
cessfully acquire grammars from a class that is unlearnable by Gold’s criterion.
To explore the extent to which language genes in the form of a highly special-
ized module could have co-evolved with language properties, another well known 
computational model was constructed by Chater et  al. (2009). They simulated a 
population of language learning agents where arbitrary linguistic principles could 
become genetically encoded via the Baldwin effect (Baldwin 1896; Weber and 
Depew 2003, for a contemporary perspective). In evolutionary biology, the Baldwin 
effect describes a process where individuals have the ability to acclimatise to new 
pressures during their lifespan by learning a new behaviour. This mechanism would 
affect the individuals’ reproductive success and the new trait could become gradu-
ally encoded in the genome over generations. However, Chater et al. (2009) showed 
in their study that this genetic encoding gets significantly reduced when the rate of 
language change is high enough. Therefore, they concluded, since language changes 
much more rapidly than genes, genetic evolution of domain-specific constrains is 
unlikely. As pointed out by Culbertson and Kirby (2016), there is nonetheless room 
for a more nuanced thesis that supports the existence of weak biases (that is, soft 
constraints that can impose a continuum of weak preferences) affecting language 
acquisition. And it could be the case that these weak biases of the individuals were 
not reflected in the spoken language.
Kirby et  al. (2007) investigated this by testing how innate biases are related to 
universal properties of language. Their model shows that cultural transmission can 
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amplify weak biases and end up producing language properties which are near uni-
versal. If this is the case, cultural transmission would have produced “apparent adap-
tations,” that prevented the evolution by natural selection of strong constraints in the 
form of domain-specific genes, mainly because those genes would be highly prone 
to drift.
We know, however, that the relationship between learners’ biases and language 
structure is not straightforward when it comes to explaining linguistic variation. In a 
recent study that uses both a Bayesian model of learning and transmission and col-
lected data from an artificial language learning experiment that mirrors the model, 
Smith et  al. (2017) showed that weak biases can have a wide range of effects on 
language structure, from strong to weak or even no effects. Therefore, transmission 
and use are essential for understanding the interactions between biases and statistical 
learning.
For the purpose of this paper, the examined models constitute sufficient evidence 
to illustrate the discussion for the next section. For a more detailed review of this 
line of work see Kirby (2017).
What does iterated learning actually require?
Berwick and Chomsky (2016) argue that cultural evolutionary approaches have gen-
erally mistaken the word “universal” as a property of the faculty of language with 
Greenberg’s linguistic universals (Greenberg 1966), or properties of externalized 
languages. They claim that what ultimately evolves in these models is a population 
of learning agents’ choices and agents that already had the ability to choose between 
two alternative concept representations. In their words, this would not solve the 
problem of where a universal comes from (e.g. compositionality) because the abil-
ity to build context free grammars, generate infinite languages and/or even some-
thing like Merge is presupposed. Thus, they conclude, iterative learning models do 
not satisfactorily attempt to delimit any pre-existing innate universal grammar (UG) 
related with the language faculty.
But this might not be the case. Iterated learning models of language evolution 
define stochastic processes that can be mathematically characterized using Markov 
chains. To analyze the requirements for iterated learning, it is necessary to under-
stand the core concepts that define the properties of Markov chains. In Appendix A, 
we provide an accessible summary that includes a brief characterization of Markov 
chains, along with a numerical example applied to language transmission. For now, 
it is important to note that Markov chains are very useful to analyze iterated learn-
ing processes by computing a transition matrix (a square matrix that gives the prob-
abilities of different languages going from one to another) and finding the stationary 
probability of each language. For more detailed explanations of Markov chains see 
Kemeny and Snell (1983), Brémaud (1999, Ch. 2) or Griffiths and Kalish (2007), for 
example.
However, in the real world, learners have individual biases that affect the 
results of the predictions of an iterated learning process that has been reduced to 
a Markov chain. In order to construct learning algorithms that incorporate a wide 
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characterization of these biases for a wide set of cognitive features, a number of 
researchers have used bayesian agents applied to human cognition (e.g. Anderson 
1990; Oaksford and Chater 1998) and the emergence of linguistic regularities (e.g. 
Kirby 2001; Brighton 2002; Smith et al. 2003). Interestingly, the predictions of these 
computational approaches have been successfully reproduced and tested against data 
obtained from psychology experiments with human participants (Tamariz and Kirby 
2015; Kirby et al. 2008).
Here, we review Bayes’ rule applied to language acquisition. For a detailed analy-
sis of iterated learning using learning algorithms based on Bayesian inference, see 
Griffiths and Kalish (2007).
The Bayesian framework used in iterative learning models computes the posterior 
probability of an event according to the Bayes’ theorem:
where P(h), named prior probability distribution, is the estimate of the probability 
of the hypothesis h ∈ H  before d is observed (it encodes learner’s biases). P(h ∣ d) 
is the posterior probability, the probability of h after d is observed. P(d ∣ h) , named 
the likelihood, is the probability of observing d given h, and P(d), named the mar-
ginal likelihood, is the probability of d averaged over all hypothesis,
Applied to language acquisition, h is a language, and d the set of utterances sampled 
from the target language. Additionally, each learner has a learning algorithm (LA) 
that specifies the procedure for choosing h after observing d, and a production algo-
rithm (PA) that specifies how they choose d given h.
Now, if we assemble this rule from generation to generation by forming an 
iterative learning process based on the principles of Bayesian inference, we have 
a Markov chain where each learner produces a set of data (a posterior distribution 
over languages) by combining a prior (representing their inductive biases) with the 
data produced by the previous generation. Then, this data is supplied to the next 
generation, and so on, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
As Griffiths and Kalish (2007) stress, a prior should not be interpreted as 
reflecting innate predispositions to language acquisition, but as a collection of 
factors, not necessarily domain-specific constraints, that affect the agents’ own 
hypothesis. So, although there might be a sense in which we could correctly say 
that there are basic functionalities built into the model, none of them are lan-
guage related. In fact, these models require only two skills: the ability to learn 
data and the ability to produce data (for transmission). The mechanisms under-
lying these abilities may be quite elaborate, but, to make the point clearer, not 
innately determined (in the traditional sense) to deal with specifically linguistic 
data.
We can observe, then, that the concept of a pre-existing biological condi-
tion leading our species alone to possess language is not in fact discussed in 
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the above computational models. Instead, what is challenged is the specificity 
and language-related origin of that genetic basis. In this line of thought, Kirby 
(2017) pointed out that if we want to look for human adaptations related to a 
precondition for language, then we might better look at the biological origin of 
these two traits: the ability to copy vast sets of behaviours, and our predisposi-
tion to share. These two non-language-specific predispositions are the only ones 
that are required for iterated learning models to work.
If this is true, the relevant question to ask now if we are looking for human 
adaptations that biologically configured the so called language-ready brain in 
our species, is which current biological approach accounts best for the emer-
gence of the key necessary biological changes that brought about the mentioned 
abilities (to copy and share). In the next section, we will suggest that evo-devo 
can be seen as the best general perspective to be taken when approaching this 
question, and we will discuss which implementation of evo-devo best fits the 
requirements of iterated learning to operate.
Throughout this investigaton, we will aim at showing that such traditional 
distinctions as general vs. specific or Faculty of Language (Narrow sense; FLN) 
vs. Faculty of Language (Broad sense; FLB) of Hauser et al. (2002), should be 
abandoned in order to construct a less simplistic developmental approach to the 
complex cognitive capacities that serve as the basis for iterative learning pro-
cesses to give rise to language universals.
Which approach should we take to account for the preconditions 
for iterated learning?
The Modern Synthesis, a term popularized by Huxley (1942), gave rise to mod-
ern biology by gathering a number of postulates from natural selection, population 
genetics and Mendelian inheritance into an articulated corpus of empirical evidence 
Fig. 1  Iterated learning has been proposed as an explanation for the emergence of linguistic regularities 
and the existence of linguistic universals. Each learner sees a set of utterances (d) produced by the previ-
ous generation, forms a hypothesis (h) about the language from which those utterances were produced, 
and uses this hypothesis to produce the data that will be supplied to the next generation. Figure adapted 
from Griffiths and Kalish (2007)
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and mathematical laws. Ernst Mayr, a key evolutionary biologist of the past cen-
tury, was one of the main figures of this conceptual revolution in the field. Among 
his contributions, articulating the biological species concept and studying different 
forms of allopatric speciation stand out. Mayr’s open skepticism towards what he 
called “beanbag genetics” notwithstanding (Mayr 1963), he nonetheless contributed 
to the consolidation of a biological thought centered on the notion of a “genetic pro-
gram” (Mayr 1982) and on a neat separation of “proximate” vs. “ultimate” causes 
(Mayr 1961). As a direct consequence of this stance, the mainstream orientation 
of the Modern Synthesis tended to ignore developmental processes and their role 
in evolutionary dynamics (Maynard  Smith 1982; Robert 2004; Amundson 2005), 
while, at the same time, organisms disappeared from the explanatory apparatus of 
evolutionary biology (Walsh 2015). However, such a view on causality has often 
been considered as highly problematic (e.g., Lewontin 1974; Oyama 2000b; Laland 
et  al. 2013; Walsh 2019), and Mayr’s genetic program has also been shown to be 
unable to reflect the environmental context-dependency of phenotypic outcomes 
(e.g., Lewontin 1983; Gilbert and Epel 2009, 2015; Sultan 2015).
But in light of the discovery of the toolkit genes (highly conserved genes whose 
products regulate gene expression and control the organism’s embryonic develop-
ment) developmental geneticists and evolutionary biologists have been forced to 
confront each other’s ideas in a more interconnected way. This filled the gap between 
both levels of analysis and gave rise to evo-devo, a new discipline that, since its ori-
gins, has been expanding upon the evolutionary synthesis (Carroll 2008; Pigliucci 
and Müller 2010, for two slightly different perspectives of this new synthesis).
Evo-devo, however, is not a unified theory (Hall 2003; Benítez-Burraco and 
Longa 2010), but a theoretical trend or general perspective where different evo-devo 
models fall here or there. Balari and Lorenzo (2013, chapter 6) describe three main 
categories of evo-devo approaches: 
1. those that encompass genome deterministic models;
2. those that include developmental factors beyond the genes but maintain a gene-
centered approach; and
3. those that hold that disparate factors interact to bring about ontogenetic outcomes.
The last category approximates what may be categorized as the “eco-evo-devo” 
approach, which shares a fair number of assumptions with the framework of the 
extended evolutionary synthesis (henceforth EES; Sultan 2017; Müller 2020). 
According to the proponents of the EES, developmental processes, including cel-
lular products, intermediate phenotypic states, environmental inputs and behavio-
ral practices, share with inclusive inheritance and niche construction, the potential 
to drive individual variation and, ultimately, evolution (Laland et al. 2015; Müller 
2017). Given this classification, it is not difficult to tell a priori which evo-devo cate-
gory fits better with the concept of a strong domain-specific faculty of language and 
which one explains human motor capacities as the result of a complex architecture 
of interconnected developmental levels.
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For example, as pointed out by Benítez-Burraco and Longa (2010), Chomsky has 
recently suggested non-trivial analogies between the biolinguistic approach (BA) 
and evo-devo (Chomsky 2007, 2010). According to Benítez-Burraco and Longa, 
however, Chomsky’s analogies mostly refer to that version of evo-devo that fully 
assumes a gene-centered perspective (e.g., Carroll 2005), a stance that might have 
been appropriate as regards the Principles-and-Parameters Theory, but that, as these 
authors extensively argue, does not even fit well with a minimalist BA. Be that as it 
may, Chomsky has also advocated for a tripartite causal model according to which 
different aspects of the linguistic phenotype may be neatly attributed to well-delim-
ited factors, namely genetic endowment, experience (i.e. the environment), and gen-
eral principles not specific to the faculty of language like principles of data analysis, 
computational efficiency, or developmental constraints, among others (Chomsky 
2005). This is precisely the kind of analysis of causes that Lewontin (1974) showed 
to be impossible and that today still survives in the nature vs. nurture debate under 
its different guises (Keller 2010).
Chomsky’s views are direct heirs of a tradition where such dichotomies as inter-
nal vs. external, inherited vs. acquired, and genes vs. environment (or culture) have 
played an important explanatory role. But this stance radically comes into conflict 
with the idea, widely shared by most supporters of view (iii) above, that nature is 
not genetic but phenotypic; that nature is not a self-contained internal program but 
rather the open-ended product of a dynamic developmental interaction between 
internal factors including genes with external, environmental ones (Oyama 2000a). 
Development thus arises from a complex network of causal interactions in which 
organism and environment co-construct each other (Laland et  al. 2013, 2014) 
through reciprocal influences that effectively break the supposed barrier between the 
internal and the external (Sultan 2015, 2019). An immediate consequence of this is 
that the genetic regulatory systems of developmental genetics loose their causal pri-
macy in favor of the causal complex made up by the organism and its environment. 
Similarly, the concept of inheritance also changes to embrace an extended form 
of inheritance where the developmental ‘resources’ range from DNA sequence, to 
environmentally-induced epigenetic marks, to the location and ecological niche the 
organism inhabits (Laland et al. 2015; Bonduriansky and Day 2018).
We have focused on Chomsky’s attitudes towards a number of crucial issues 
that eco-evo-devo invites us to look at through a different prism, but it should 
be clear that some of these criticisms also apply to other frameworks, not nec-
essarily friendly to Chomskyan thought. To be sure, since—and paraphrasing 
Lewontin (1974, p. 401)—the relevant questions are not whether the phenotype 
of an individual is the result of either environment or genotype, or of either 
biology or culture, or of either nature or nurture, because the phenotype, to the 
extent that all these dichotomies make real sense, is the result of both. Accord-
ingly, the framework we are advocating for here definitely shares a number of 
central points with Cecilia Heyes’s “Cogntive Gadgets” (Heyes 2018). Indeed, 
we agree that when the cognitive equipment of newborn humans is exposed to 
“culture-soaked” human environments, it changes dramatically. Similarly, in this 
paper we propose that we are born endowed with complex cognitive mechanisms 
that emerge as part of our development and that these mechanisms continue to 
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develop throughout life within our deeply social and anthropized environments. 
These social environments constitute diverse human niches, which are in turn 
affected by horizontal and vertical transmission processes in which the ability 
to copy and share information at a fast rate play a crucial role (Tomasello et al. 
2005; Tomasello and Carpenter 2007; Laland 2017a). But our approach here also 
differs from Heyes (2018), at least, in denying the necessity, if not the possibil-
ity, of retaining the nature vs. nurture dichotomy and of neatly identify the causal 
contribution of each. The cognitive equipment of newborn humans may not dif-
fer substantially from the minds of closely related species. Yet, human cognitive 
diversity and evolved predispositions might be the product of observable causal 
processes whose causes can not be depicted as totally disentangled, because that 
would lead to epistemological contradictions when it comes to clearly delimit-
ing objects, causes and effects. For example, DNA is both inherited and envi-
ronmentally responsive, and we know this in enough detail to move beyond the 
nature-nurture debate) (Robinson 2004). Thus, in the model we propose here, the 
contingencies of those traditional categories are reduced to mere instrumental 
categories.
To the extent that this new paradigm constitutes the recognition of the need 
to adopt a pluralistic attitude toward the complex nature of the language faculty, 
the emergence of which can not be clearly quantified in terms of internal versus 
external structures, nor characterized as a unique object, we think that eco-evo-
devo and EES approaches are also demanding the abandonment of such tradi-
tional distinctions as FLN/FLB and others already we already referred to above. 
Many of these arguments that we will not expand here have been amply analyzed 
using a variety of biolinguistic approaches (Boeckx 2014; Balari and Lorenzo 
2018).
Dropping such distinctions, we think, the search for the faculty of language is 
also freed, to some extent, from the metaphor of specificity/generality, facilitating 
the construction of a non-reductionist, less simplistic, general theory of language 
that encompasses a complex multifactorial cognitive human capacity that does 
not yield specific linguistic outputs by itself, but is required subsequently to give 
rise to the phenotype through learning and transmission.
In the next section we will revisit some studies that add evidence to support 
such an interconnection of factors underlying the so-called “language-ready 
brain,” without the need for strong straight dependencies between specific genes 
and specific language properties—even if key genes have obvious subsequent 
dramatic effects on the development of language. We will focus on the relation-
ship between genetic factors, such as FOXP2, and cognitive abilities. Then, in the 
light of niche construction, we will argue in favor of a general theory of language 
evolution that integrates the developmental architecture of cognitive abilities and 
iterated learning models.
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Towards an integrated theory: insights from comparative genomics 
and niche construction
As soon as we depart from a simplistic gene-centered approach that relies on 
an incredibly lucky mutation or behaviorally assimilated trait to explain lan-
guage complexity and our capacity to acquire it, we face the need to expand our 
approach to incorporate developmental processes that explain how complex func-
tional phenomena evolve. During the last decades, neuroscientists have gather 
evidence that some cognitive domains can operate as overlapping functional 
architectures. For example, language processing has traditionally been associ-
ated to Broca’s area, but fMRI studies have also identified activation patterns in 
Broca’s area associated with recognition, imitation or movement preparation (e.g. 
Anderson 2010). These neural reuse theories seem to be incompatible with strong 
conceptions of structural or functional modularity and offer an interesting per-
spective for the conception of more comprehensive evolutionary-developmental 
models.
Recent evo-devo approaches have focused on the molecular analysis of behav-
ioural traits such as learning and memory applied to the evolution of language. 
For example, genes relevant for language, including the transcription factor 
FOXP2, have been identified. FOXP2 was initially identified as a genetic factor of 
a speech disorder in a family known as KE, and was thus the first gene to be asso-
ciated with speech and language (Fisher et al. 1998; Lai et al. 2000).
Despite the strong correlation between a FOXP2 variant and developmental 
verbal dyspraxia (DVD) (Lai et al. 2001), it must be noted that FOXP2 belongs 
to a complex molecular network of genes that build proteins that in turn regu-
late the expression of other genes. In particular, FOXP2 is controlled by a set 
of upstream regulators, and in turn it regulates a vast set of target downstream 
genes, by repressing or activating them (Shu et al. 2001; Vernes et al. 2007).
Although FOXP2 is the best known gene in the field of language evolution, it 
doesn’t work alone. A huge variety of gene products regulate neuronal development 
and function, including “proliferation, migration, neurite outgrowth, and axon guid-
ance, as well as development, maintenance, and plasticity of synapses” (Fisher and 
Vernes 2015). From an evo-devo point of view, human speech can be described as a 
form of auditory-guided, learned vocal motor behaviour, and FOXP2 and its regula-
tory molecular network might be key factors to “shape neural plasticity in cortico-
basal ganglia circuits underlying the sensory-guided motor learning in animal mod-
els” (Scharff and Petri 2011). Indeed, the connection between vocal learning abilities 
in several species including humans and a number of homologous gene networks 
and brain structures is today incontestable (Jarvis 2019, for a review). Since lan-
guage is culturally transmitted, a cognitive impediment within these molecular net-
works would affect the emergence of language properties in a community through 
iterative learning processes. Actually, the emergence of language properties through 
cultural transmission requires both ingredients: the adequate development of neural 
circuits and the adequate social structure. Note that neither of these components by 
themselves would be able to result in linguistic specific outcomes.
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So, to what extent have these two processes (the emergence of a regulatory neu-
ral network and the social requirements for iterated information transmission) devel-
oped independently one from the other? In Sect. 4, we showed that iterated learn-
ing does not require innately determined abilities to account for the emergence of 
linguistic regularities and in Sect.  5 we showed that an “eco-evo-devo” approach 
is a valid framework to account for the preconditions for iterated learning without 
the need of relying on strong genetic constraints. Both, iterated learning processes 
by generating novel linguistic phenotypes, and “eco-evo-devo” processes (such as 
developmental plasticity, genetic accommodation and extragenic inheritance) by 
facilitating evolutionary transitions and the alteration of environments and niche 
construction (Gilbert et al. 2015), shape evolution by constructing extended pheno-
types (Simon and Hessen 2019), which in turn promote niche construction, that is, 
the ability to produce a better nests, houses, institutions or environments (including 
linguistic ones).
Niche construction, therefore, can be thought of as an emergent property of tri-
ple-inheritance systems that take into account all the three transmission pathways 
of genes, culture and environment (Kobayashi et al. 2019). Just as adaptive behavio-
ral phenomena results from iterative processes at different scales, niche construction 
selects the behavior of the organisms in an iterative process during ontogeny (Simon 
and Hessen 2019). Organisms’ traits develop by interacting with the environment, 
and in turn increasing the expression of synergistic relationships between different 
levels of development (Lewontin 1983). A similar argument was originally offered 
by Deacon (1997) and Bickerton (2009), where it is suggested that the repetitive use 
of symbolic communication can create socially artificial niches that in turn enforce 
new pressures on human cognition.
Using ideas originally developed by Lewontin (1983), Laland et al. (2000) con-
structed a version of this conceptual model by mapping the causal relationship 
between biological evolution and cultural change. This model proposes that bio-
logical evolution depends not only on natural selection and genetic inheritance but 
also on “niche construction.” According to this framework, phenotypes have a more 
active role in development and culture amplifies the human capacity to alter sources 
of natural selection. Cultural traits affect the environment and may have additional 
effects on how evolution proceeds. These changes, in turn, may persist through-
out generations, beyond the lifespan of an individual organism. Crucially, cultural 
change can occur at a much faster rate than biological change. Culture, therefore, 
can relax or intensify selection and create new demands by changing ecology, which 
favors new adaptations (Whitehead et al. 2019). Interestingly, a relaxation of selec-
tion at the organism level may have given rise to new complex synergistic features 
of the human language capacity, which may explain why so much language informa-
tion is “inherited” socially (Deacon 2010). At the level of the population, as our spe-
cies constructed its niche for enhanced social relations, where “self-domestication” 
or “self-control” might have driven the selection of anatomical and behavioral traits 
whose functionality is related with mild neural crest cell deficits during embryonic 
development (Wilkins et al. 2014; Thomas and Kirby 2010; Shilton et al. 2020).
Niche construction can result from different sources (genetic, ontogenetic, and 
cultural processes) and affect both biological and cultural evolution (Laland et  al. 
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2000); for a number of examples, see Naiman et al. (1988), for beavers, Laskowski 
and Pruitt (2014), for social spiders, and Feldman and Cavalli-Sforza (1976) and 
Lotem et al. (2017), for some cases concerning humans.
Regarding communication, niche construction has also been invoked in hypoth-
eses about language evolution (e.g., Bickerton 2009, 2014; Deacon 2010; Laland 
2017b, among others). A number of learning biases and sensory-guided motor 
capacities (e.g. vocal control) evolved in response to new environmental and social 
pressures. Since this new communicative feature became extremely important 
within human populations for successful integration in human societies and, in turn, 
reproduction, it also could have brought about selection favoring better acquisition 
and transmission. This would obviously include our capacity to copy and share large 
sets of communicative variants. However, unlike deterministic and Baldwinian mod-
els, niche construction does not assume genetic assimilation of linguistic features, 
nor innate or language-specific knowledge. Instead, niche construction favors selec-
tion of motor capacities, cognitive biases and environments (e.g. social structures) 
that in turn facilitate the maintenance of such a niche.
Using a version of the previous niche construction framework, a general causal 
graph can be constructed by putting together all the interactions between the rel-
evant variables (Fig. 2). A key feature that differentiates our model is the inclusion 
of insights from both iterated learning models and current eco-evo-devo theoreti-
cal approaches. The model is constructed in the light of comparative genomics and 
niche construction: in our integrated version, niche construction processes, which 
are in continuous interaction with both the individual motor capacities of individuals 
and the environment, favor transmission trough iterative learning processes, result-
ing in a particular language phenotype. Thus, niche construction is considered as 
a key feature of the model, since it has a prominent role altering two main sources 
of variation that are directly related with iterated learning processes. On the one 
hand, sensory guided motor capacities from neural development, and on the other, 
environmental structures such as social structures, rules or cultural conventions. In 
turn, a change in these two sources of variation can be identified as two factors that 
modify the agents’ learning and production algorithms during cultural transmission. 
This consequently connects neural development and the agents’ own hypotheses in 
a way that could be potentially implementable by using iterated learning models. 
To capture this idea in an integrated model, each learner’s learning algorithm (LA) 
and production algorithm (PA) should be constructed as a function of the variables 
altered by niche construction. Since cultural transmission of language occurs at a 
much faster rate than organic evolution, it can quickly create new pressures that, 
in fast iterative cycles, accelerate the emergence of new linguistic adaptations. This 
effect would relax selection at the level of the individual, due to a large redistribution 
of selective pressures and a diversification of social traits inheritance mechanisms.
We agree with Odling-Smee and Laland (2009) that niche construction will fail 
to account for the evolution/development of human language until we take into 
account the exceptionally powerful role of human cultural processes and the mutual 
scaffolding effects between them, cognitive abilities, and individual biases in our 
species (Wimsatt and Griesemer 2007; Wimsatt 2014). For example, since language 
change occurs at a faster rate than genetic changes, neural development selected for 
1 3
Eco-evo-devo and iterated learning: towards an integrated… Page 15 of 23 42
language might reflect “the most persistent and invariant demands of the highly vari-
able linguistic niche” (Deacon 2010; Chater et al. 2009). This idea is coherent with 
a model that incorporates niche construction, organic and cultural evolution, where 
phenotypes (such as the language phenotype) have a much more active role in evolu-
tion (Laland et al. 2000; Gilbert and Epel 2009, 2015; Sultan 2015).
Moreover, since the construction of human cultural niches is able to favor 
effective cultural responses beyond the lifetime of individuals, with impact, or 
absence thereof, on human genetics, it adds more uncertainty into the evolution-
ary process. Depending on the time-frame used, the social and environmental 
structure, and the specific communicative feature examined, researchers might 
find different niche construction effects. Individual cases will require individual 
explanations, and they are showing little by little that the dissolution of tradi-
tional dichotomies based on general observations is more necessary than ever 
before. Here, computer modeling of language evolution that simulates population 
dynamics using iterative learning are helpful to expand upon theoretical frame-
works for language development like the one that we present here.
There are several reasons to think that cultural niche construction can offer 
an alternative framework to understand language evolution and bring about new 


































Fig. 2  Integrated causal graph for the emergence of a language phenotype through developmental inter-
actions. A change in the source variable causes a change in the destination variable. The area of the 
square in the middle represents learning and production through iterated learning processes. Learning 
and production algorithms interact with the environment and the neural plasticity underlying the individ-
ual sensory-guided motor capacities. Niche construction from all ontogenetic processes modifies human 
selective environments. In turn, individual motor capacities within a population with social structures 
favoring transmission through iterative processes would result in a particular language phenotype. This 
integrated theory does not assume that acquired language regularities became innate or specific. Instead, 
language phenotypes would have evolved due to selection affecting multiple levels of all these mecha-
nisms (this is represented in the graph with the right hand bracket). From generation to generation, lan-
guage change occurs faster than other biological processes (this is represented in the causal graph with 
arrow thickness). Dashed lines represent permeability between developmental categories. Some relations 
of this causal graph have been designed following an EES framework (Lewens 2019)
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hypotheses to test the compatibility of biological and cultural explanations of lan-
guage. First, cultural niche construction itself is a useful eco-evo-devo approach 
to fill the gap between traditional dichotomies in the field of language evolu-
tion (e.g. biological/cultural, specific/general). Second, it does not assume that 
acquired language regularities themselves ever become innate (Deacon 2003, 
2010) nor cultural responses automatically genetically encoded (Odling-Smee 
and Laland 2009). And third, it gives room to integrate under the same umbrella 
the developmental molecular processes leading to the language capacity and the 
developmental processes of language change leading to the emergence of lan-
guage universals.
In recent decades, advances in molecular biology and computational modelling 
have incredibly narrowed down the processes of ecological inheritance related with 
language structures. Language is endowed with complex regularities that can not 
be explained by learning nor transmission alone, nor by genetic encoding of human 
behaviours. And such complexity will probably remain unsolved for several more 
decades, or more. In the meantime, one observation seems clear, whatever approach 
we take to explain language development and evolution, it will necessarily have to 
consider the vast interconnectedness of genetic, ontogenetic and cultural factors that 
shape language.
Conclusions
In this article we have reviewed a number of studies that show that iterated learning 
does not require strong genetic constraints in the form of a domain-specific mod-
ule to give rise to near language universals. Instead, general abilities unrelated with 
informational specificity, such as the ability to copy and to share, are required to 
develop language through cultural evolution. These general abilities can neverthe-
less yield specific properties, and might have emerged from a complex multifactorial 
cognitive human capacity that includes genes, cellular products, phenotypic states, 
environmental inputs and behavioral practices. Here we have argued that the devel-
opmental explanation of human abilities and iterated learning through cultural trans-
mission are mutually dependent processes and therefore compatible, insofar as both 
are common processes and interact stabilizing selection at different levels. We have 
used the notion of niche construction to sketch an integrated framework that builds 
bridges between evolutionary developmental accounts for sensory-guided motor 
capacities and cultural evolution guided by iterated learning models. This integrated 
model aims to overcome traditional boundaries between biological and cultural 
approaches in the debates of language evolution.
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Appendix A Markov chains and language transmission
A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables X0,X1, ...,Xn, ... such that,
And,
This means that the distribution of the forthcoming state Xn+1 depends only on the 
current state Xn and is independent of all the predecessors.




 , and the probabil-
ity to move from state si to state sj is named transition probability pij:
If the Markov chain is homogeneous, meaning that the underlying transition prob-
abilities remain constant over time:
We can represent the distribution of transition probabilities with a transition matrix 
T = (pij) , where each element in the matrix represents the transition probability pij 
from state si to sj:
To provide a numerical example of an iterated learning process, consider a Markov 
chain with 2 possible states (e.g. two possible languages l1 and l2):
Here, p11 = 0.8 is the probability that X1 = s1 given that we observed X0 = s1 , and 
so on. In the case of language transmission, p11 represents the probability that a 
learner acquires l1 from data produced form l1 . p12 represents the probability that a 
learner acquires l1 from data produced form l2 , and so on.
(3)P(Xn+1 = xn+1 ∣ X1 = x1,X2 = x2, ...,Xn = xn)
(4)P(Xn+1 = xn+1 ∣ Xn = xn)
(5)pij = P(X1 = sj ∣ X0 = si)
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 . Then, the 
probability distribution of languages after 1 step is:
After 2 steps, since ln = ln−1T  , we have:
which means that the stationary probability of each of the two languages is deter-
mined by the fidelity of transmission in the Markov chain. Thus, the stationary prob-
ability of l1 in the second step is 0.17, P(X2 = l1 ∣ X0 = l2) = 0.17 , while the prob-
ability of l2 is P(X2 = l2 ∣ X0 = l2) = 0.83.
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